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CITIZEN SUITS ALLEGING PAST VIOLATIONS
OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT
Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972 (Clean Water Act)' to provide for the restoration and maintenance
of the purity of the nation's waters. 2 The Clean Water Act established the
national goal of eliminating the discharge of all pollutants into the nation's

waters by 1985.3 Section 301 of the Clean Water Act prohibits generally the
discharge of any pollutant into navigable waters 4 unless the polluter complies
with the provisions of the Clean Water Act.' In addition, the Clean Water

Act confers authority upon the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to promulgate technology-based national effluent standards and limitations. 6 The primary mechanism for enforcing the national

1. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2,
86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as Clean
Water Act].
2. Clean Water Act, § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982). Prior to the enactment of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water Act), federal law
required states to promulgate water quality standards for defined bodies of interstate waters.
See S. REP. No. 414, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 414],
reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF
1972, at 1420 (1973) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. State water quality standards,
subject to federal approval, expressed the maximum amount of pollution allowable in a
designated body of water. S. REP. No. 414, supra at 4, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra at 1422. Discharges of pollutants that reduced water quality below the levels specified in
the state water quality standards enabled the states and the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to commence actions to abate the pollution. S. REP. No. 414, supra
at 4, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra at 1422. Implementation and enforcement of
water quality standards, however, proved inadequate because of difficulties in establishing
precise effluent limitations based on the level of water quality desired for a given body of water.
S. REP. No. 414, supra at 8, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra at 1426. The Clean
Water Act requires use of pollution control technology and imposes effluent limitations on
point sources of pollution rather than on receiving bodies of water. S. REP. No. 414, supra at
41-42, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 1459-60; see infra note 6 (discussing effluent
standards and limitations for point sources of pollution based on pollution control technology).
3. Clean Water Act, § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982).
4. See Clean Water Act, § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1982). The Clean Water Act
defines "navigable waters" as the "waters of the United States, including the territorial seas."
Id.
5. Clean Water Act, § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1982). See generally, F. GRAD, I
TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 3.03 (1985) (discussing federal regulation of water pollution
under Clean Water Act).
6. Clean Water Act, §§ 304, 306-307, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314, 1316-1317 (1982). Effluent
limitations are restrictions on the quantity, rate, or concentration of discharges of chemical,
physical, and biological pollutants into the navigable waters. Id. § 502(11), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11)
(1982). Section 304(b) of the Clean Water Act requires the Administrator of the EPA to
promulgate regulations that establish guidelines for effluent limitations in accordance with

section 301 of the Clean Water Act. Id. § 304(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1982). Section 301(b)
provides for the establishment of effluent limitations for all existing point sources of pollution.
Id. § 301(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1982). Under the Clean Water Act, a point source is "any
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effluent limitations and standards is the National Pollutant Discharge Elim1
ination System (NPDES) created by section 402 of the Clean Water Act.
Section 402 authorizes the Administrator of the EPA and the states to issue

NPDES permits that limit the discharge of pollutants in accordance with the
national effluent standards and limitations. 8 Accordingly, the Clean Water
Act grants concurrent authority to both the Administrator of the EPA and
the states to enforce effluent standards and limitations. 9 In addition to

discernible, confined and discrete conveyance" used to discharge pollutants into the water. Id.
§ 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1982). Examples of point sources include pipes, ditches,
tunnels, wells, containers, and vessels. Id. Section 301(b)(1)(A) requires polluters, no later than
July 1, 1977, to use the "best practicable control technology currently available" to achieve
effluent limitations for existing point sources of pollution. Id. § 301(b)(l)(A), 33 U.S.C. §
1311(b)(l)(A) (1982). By July 1, 1987, polluters must use the "best available technology
economically achievable" to meet effluent limitations for existing point sources of pollution.
Id. § 301(b)(2)(A), (F), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A), (F) (1982). In addition, for conventional
pollutants identified pursuant to section 304(b)(4), section 301(b)(2)(E) requires polluters to use,
no later than July 1, 1984, the "best conventional pollutant control technology" to achieve
effluent limitations for existing point sources of pollution. Id. § 301(b)(2)(E), 33 U.S.C. §
1311(b)(2)(E) (1982); see id. § 304(b)(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4) (1982). Conventional pollutants
include "pollutants classified as biological oxygen demanding, suspended solids, fecal coliform,
and pH." Id. § 304(a)(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(aX4) (1982).
Section 306 of the Clean Water Act requires the Administrator of the EPA to publish
regulations that establish standards of performance for all new sources of pollution. Id. §
306(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(l)(B) (1982). A "standard of performance" controls the
discharge of pollutants by application of the "best available demonstrated control technology."
Id. § 306(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1) (1982). A "new source" of pollution is any source of
pollution constructed after the publishing of regulations which are applicable to the source. Id.
§ 306(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(2) (1982).
Section 307 of the Clean Water Act authorizes the Administrator of the EPA to establish
effluent standards for all toxic pollutants. Id. § 307(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(aX2) (1982). Effluent
limitations for toxic pollutants require application of the "best available technology economically
achievable" for point sources of pollution. Id. In addition, section 307 requires the Administrator to establish pretreatment standards for discharges of pollutants that would interfere with
publicly owned treatment works. Id. § 307(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b) (1982).
7. See Clean Water Act, § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982). Section 402 of the Clean Water
Act authorizes the Administrator of the EPA and the states to issue National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permits for discharges of pollutants. Id. § 402(a), (b), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(a), (b) (1982). NPDES permits control the quality and quantity of pollutants which a
polluter may discharge lawfully in accordance with effluent standards and limitations. Id.
8. Id. § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982); see supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing
NPDES permit system of Clean Water Act).
9. See Clean Water Act, §§ 309, 402(b)(7), 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1319, 1342(b)(7), 1370
(1982). Section 309 authorizes the Administrator of the EPA to bring a civil action against any
person who violates an effluent standard or limitation or who violates an NPDES permit. Id.
§ 309(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1982). In a civil action under section 309, the Administrator of
the EPA may ask the court to assess criminal or civil penalties against a polluter. Id. § 309(c),
(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c), (d) (1982).
Section 402 of the Clean Water Act requires the states to implement programs to abate
violations of NPDES permits and to provide for criminal and civil penalties against polluters.
Id. § 402(b)(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(7) (1982). Section 510 of the Clean Water Act recognizes
the authority of the states to enforce any effluent standard of limitation on the discharge of
pollutants. Id. § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1982). In addition, section 510 recognizes the authority
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granting specific enforcement powers to the EPA and to the states, the Clean

Water Act provides for direct public participation in the enforcement of
effluent standards and limitations.' 0

Section 505 of the Clean Water Act permits a private citizen" to institute
a civil action in a federal district court against any person "alleged to be in
violation" of an effluent standard, limitation, or order12 under the Clean
Water Act." Recently, some courts have construed narrowly the language of

of the states to impose more stringent effluent limitations and standards on discharges of
pollutants. Id.
10. Id. § 101(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (1982); see id. § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982)
(authorizing citizens to file suit against Administrator of EPA for failure to perform nondiscretionary function and against polluters for violations of effluent standards, limitations, or
orders); infra note 11-25 and accompanying text (discssing requirements of citizen suit
provision).
11. See Clean Water Act, § 505(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1982). To establish standing in
a citizen suit, a person must meet the definition of "citizen" established in section 505(g) of
the Clean Water Act. Id. Section 505(g) provides that a citizen is "a person or persons having
an interest which is or may be adversely affected." Id. Most citizen suit provisions in other
environmental regulatory statutes provide that "any person" may commence suit. See, e.g.,
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, § 520(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a) (1982) (authorizing
any person to initiate citizen suit); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, § 7002(a), 42
U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1982) (same); Clean Air Act, § 304(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1982) (same).
The language of section 505(g) reflects a conscious attempt by Congress to meet the constitutional
standing requirements expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Sierra Club v. Morton.
See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint because complaint failed to allege that defendant's actions would adversely affect
interests of plaintiff). See generally Miller, Private Enforcement of FederalPollution Control
Laws: Part I, 12 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10309, 10314-17 (1983) (discussing definition
of citizen and constitutional standing requirement for persons entitled to bring citizen suits).
12. See Clean Water Act, § 505(f), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f) (1982). Under section 505(f) of
the Clean Water Act, violation of an "effluent standard or limitation" is defined as an unlawful
act under section 301(a); violation of an effluent limitation under sections 301 and 302; violation
of an effluent standard of performance under section 306; violation of a prohibition, effluent
standard or pretreatment standard under 307; noncompliance with a certification under section
401; or noncompliance with an NPDES permit issued under section 402 of the Clean Water
Act. Id. An effluent "order" is an order issued by the Administrator of the EPA or a state
concerning an effluent standard or limitation. Id. § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1982).
Section 309(a) of the Clean Water Act, for example, provides that the Administrator of the
EPA may issue a compliance order whenever the Administrator determines that a polluter is in
violation of an effluent standard or limitation or an NPDES permit issued pursuant to section
402. Id. § 309(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a). Any person who violates an effluent standard, limitation,
or order established or issued pursuant to sections 301, 302, 306, 307, 401, or 402 is subject to
government enforcement proceedings under section 309 or citizen enforcement proceedings
under section 505. Id. §§ 309, 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1319, 1365 (1982); see also supra note 6 and
accompanying text (discussing promulgation of effluent standards and limitations and pretreatment standards by Administrator of EPA pursuant to Clean Water Act); supra notes 7-8 and
accompanying text (discussing NPDES permit system in Clean Water Act); supra note 9 and
accompanying text (discussing government enforcement authority under Clean Water Act); infra
notes 13-25 and accompanying text (discussing citizen suit provision of Clean Water Act).
13. Clean Water Act, § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982). The Clean Water Act permits
a citizen to commence a citizen suit "against any person who is alleged to be in violation" of
an effluent standard, limitation, or order. Id. Under the Clean Water Act "any person" includes
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section 505 to allow citizen suits based only on continuing violations of an
effluent standard, limitation, or order. 4 A narrow construction of section
505, therefore, may prevent a citizen suit against a polluter who had violated
an effluent standard, limitation, or order in the past, but who is currently
in compliance with the standard, limitation, or order."5 In contrast, a broad
construction of section 505 would allow citizen suits based on any violation

of an effluent standard, limitation, or order.16 For example, a broad con-

struction of section 505 would permit a citizen to file suit against a polluter
who is violating, or had violated in the past, an effluent standard, limitation,
7

or order.'
Regardless whether a district court adopts a narrow or broad construction
of section 505, a citizen wishing to file a citizen suit under section 505 of
the Clean Water Act first must comply with the notice of intent to sue
requirements of section 505(b). 8 Under section 505(b) a citizen must give
sixty days notice of the impending suit to the Administrator of the EPA,
the appropriate state agency in which the citizen will file suit, and the
prospective defendant before filing the suit in a federal district court.' 9 In
addition to requiring notice of intent to sue, section 505(b) precludes a

the United States and any governmental instrumentality or agency. Id. In addition to authorizing
a citizen suit against any person who violates an effluent standard, limitation, or order, the
Clean Water Act permits a citizen to commence a civil action against the Administrator of the
EPA for the Administrator's failure to perform a nondiscretionary act or duty under the Clean
Water Act. Id.
14. See, e.g., Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 756 F.2d 392, 396 (5th Cir.
1985) (requiring continuing violation of effluent standard of limitation at time plaintiff files
citizen suit under section 505 of Clean Water Act); Sierra Club v. Copolymer Rubber and
Chem. Corp., 621 F. Supp. 1013, 1014 (M.D. La. 1985) (applying Hamker court's reasoning
to dismiss citizen suit under section 505 of Clean Water Act when plaintiff's complaint alleged
only past violations of effluent standard, limitation, or order); Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v.
Ciba-Geigy Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1390, 1391-92 (1984) (dismissing citizen suit under
section 505 of Clean Water Act because plaintiff's complaint failed to allege ongoing violation
of effluent standard, limitation, or order); see also Clean Water Act, § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. §
1365(a) (1982) (authorizing citizen suits under section 505 of Clean Water Act against polluters
"alleged to be in violation" of effluent standard, limitation, or order).
15. See Fadil, Citizen Suits Against Polluters: Picking Up the Pace, 9 H.iv. ENVTL. L.
REv. 23, 44 (1985) (noting that narrow interpretation of section 505 of Clean Water Act would
preclude citizen suits based on past violations).
16. See Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws: Part 11, 14
ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10063, 10080 (1984) (arguing that language and underlying
policy considerations of section 505 of Clean Water Act suggest that courts may assess civil
penalties for both past and continuing violations of effluent standards, limitations, or orders).
17. See, e.g., Fishel v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1531, 1540-41 (M.D. Pa.
1985) (finding that plaintiff in citizen suit may seek civil penalities for past violations of Clean
Water Act); Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 600 F.
Supp. 1474, 1475-77 (D.N.J. 1985) (holding that section 505 of Clean Water Act authorizes
citizens to seek civil penalties for past violations of effluent standard or limitation); Sierra Club
v. Raytheon Co., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1050, 1053-55 (1984) (holding that section 505 of
Clean Water Act gives citizens right to seek civil penalties for past violations).
18. Clean Water Act, § 505(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1982).
19. Id. § 505(b)(l)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) (1982).
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citizen from filing suit if either the EPA or a state agency has commenced a
civil or criminal action in a state or federal court and diligently is prosecuting
the alleged polluter for violation of an effluent standard, limitation, or
order.20 Section 505(b), however, provides for a citizen's intervention in the
action as a matter of right, if diligent prosecution in federal court of an
alleged violator precludes a citizen from initiating a citizen suit. 2'
Once a citizen has satisfied the requirements of section 505(b) and has
filed suit in a federal district court, the citizen may petition the district court
for injunctive relief to force compliance with an effluent standard, limitation,
or order. 22 In addition, the citizen may seek litigation costs under section
505(d) and appropriate civil penalities in accordance with section 309(d) of
the Clean Water Act. 2a Civil penalties for violations of an effluent standard,
limitation, or order are payable to the Federal Treasury rather than to the
24
citizen plaintiff and can amount up to 10,000 dollars per day of violation.
If a district court adopts a broad construction of section 505 in a citizen suit
and finds a polluter liable for frequent past violations of an effluent standard,
limitation, or order, the civil penalties assessed against a polluter can amount
26
to a rather large sum. 25 In Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co.,
however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adopted
a narrow construction of section 505 and held that a citizen who alleges only
past violations of an effluent standard, limitation, or order may not bring a
27
civil action against a polluter under section 505 of the Clean Water Act.
In Hamker, the plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas alleging that the defendant had discharged

20. Id. § 505(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(l)(B) (1982).
21. Id.
22. Id. § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982).
23. Id. § 505(a) (d), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), (d) (1982); see id. § 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d)
(1982) (authorizing Administrator of EPA to seek civil penalties in actions against polluters for
violation of the Clean Water Act).
24. Id. 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1982).
25. See Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542,
1556 (E.D. Va. 1985), aff'd, 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986). The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia in Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.
found that the defendant had exceeded the defendant's monthly limitation for 666 days. Id. at
1555-56. The Gwaltney court determined that the defendant was subject- to a maximum penalty
of S6,660,000. Id. at 1556. Declining to impose the maximum penalty, however, the Gwaltney
court referred to the Environmental Protection Agency Civil Penalty Policy. Id. The EPA Civil
Penalty Policy encourages the courts to examine the economic benefit accrued to the violator
as a result of noncompliance and the gravity of the violator's noncompliance to determine the
appropriate civil penalty levied against a violator. See Environmental Protection Agency Civil
Penalty Policy, [Federal Laws] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 41:2991 (June 1, 1984). After estimation of
an appropriate penalty, the EPA Civil Penalty Policy recommends an adjustment of the penalty
that reflects the defendant's culpability, remedial cooperation, history of noncompliance, and
ability to pay. Id. at 41:3000-02. Applying the factors established in the EPA Civil Penalty
Policy, the Gwaltney court assessed a total civil penalty of $1,285,322. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp.
at 1557-65.
26. 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985).
27. Id. at 394-99.
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crude petroleum into a creek which flowed onto the plaintiff's property in
violation of section 301 of the Clean Water Act.2 8 The plaintiff's complaint
requested the district court to enjoin the defendant from committing future
violations of the Clean Water Act. 29 In addition, the plaintiff requested the
district court to impose on the defendant a civil penalty of 10,000 dollars
per day of violation -and to award litigation costs to the plaintiff. 0 In the
plaintiff's pendent state law claim for damages, the plaintiff additionally
sought 40,000 dollars in compensatory damages and 120,000 dollars in
punitive damages. 3' The defendant denied the plaintiff's allegations and
further contended that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
because section 505 of the Clean Water Act authorizes citizen suits that
allege only continuing violations of an effluent standard, limitation, or
order.32 Treating the defendant's contention as a motion to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, the district court dismissed the plaintiff's
complaint.13 The district court held that section 505 allows only prospective
relief and does not authorize suits for past violations of the Clean Water
34

Act.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 35 Perceiving no ambiguity in the statutory
language of section 505, the Fifth Circuit determined that section 505 requires
a plaintiff in a citizen suit to allege a continuing violation. 36 The Fifth Circuit
28. Id. at 394. The defendant in Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. operated an

oil pipeline that leaked approximately 2,400 barrels of crude oil into a stream that flowed onto
the plaintiff's property. Id. The plaintiff in Hamker asserted that the defendant's efforts to
clean up the oil spill were grossly inadequate and perpetuated the contamination of the stream.
Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.

31. Id. In Hamker, the plaintiffs asserted negligence on behalf of the defendant in failing
to exercise reasonable care in operating and maintaining the defendant's oil pipeline. Id. Under
pendent jurisdiction, the Hamker plaintiffs filed a state law claim seeking compensation for
damage to aquatic life in the stream, loss of use of the stream, and loss of value to the
plaintiff's property. Id. The Hamker plaintiff also sought punitive damages for the defendant's
gross negligence. Id.
32. Id. In addition to asserting lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the defendant in
Hamker asserted that the plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim upon which the court
could grant relief. Id. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas,
however, dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and did not address the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint. Id.
33. Id.

34. Id. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas in Hamker
stated that section 505 of the Clean Water Act provides for only prospective relief of continuing
violations of an effluent standard, limitation, or order, does not permit recovery of damages,
and does not establish an implied cause of action. Id.
35. Id. at 399.

36. Id. at 395; see Clean Water Act, § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982) (authorizing
citizen suits against polluters who are "in violation" of an effluent standard, limitation, or
order); supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text (discussing different interpretations of language
of section 505 of Clean Water Act).
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reasoned that, when the language of a statute is unambiguous, the court
need not consider the statute's legislative history.17 The plaintiff in Hamker
argued that section 505 authorizes citizen suits based on past violations."
The Fifth Circuit, however, rejected the plaintiff's argument and found that
the plaintiff's interpretation of section 505 strained the ordinary language of
the statute. 9
The Fifth Circuit in Hamker further determined that the purpose of
citizen suits under section 505 is to supplement the primary enforcement
powers that Congress granted to the Administrator of the EPA in section
309 of the Clean Water Act. 40 Section 309 authorizes the Administrator of
the EPA to bring a civil action and to seek criminal or civil penalties for
violations of an effluent standard, limitation, or order. 41 The Fifth Circuit
in Hamker recognized that the Administrator of the EPA may have authority
to seek redress for past violations.4 2 Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit found
that the power of citizens to seek redress for violations under section 505
does not permit citizens to duplicate the power of the Administrator of the
EPA to bring suit under section 309. 43 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit found
that the notice requirement of section 505 indicates that citizens must allege
continuing violations of an effluent standard, limitation, or order.4 In
support of the Fifth Circuit's holding that plaintiffs in citizen suits must
allege continuing violations, the Fifth Circuit noted that if the Administrator

37. Hamker, 756 F.2d at 395. Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in Hamker did not consider the legislative history of the Clean Water Act in reaching a
holding, the Fifth Circuit noted that the legislative history supported the court's decision to
preclude citizen suits based on past violations. Hamker, 756 F.2d at 395, n. I; see Ex Parte
Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949) (holding that clear statutory language precludes need to refer to
legislative history of statute). But see infra notes 78-85 and accompanying text (arguing that
legislative history and statutory construction of Clean Water Act supports broad interpretation
of section 505 authorizing citizen suits for both past and continuing violations of effluent
standard, limitation, or order).
38. Hamker, 756 F.2d at 395.
39. Id.
40. Id. The Fifth Circuit in Hamker noted that the states and the Administrator of the
EPA have concurrent enforcement responsibility under the Clean Water Act. Id. In addition,
the Fifth Circuit recognized that the Administrator of the EPA has sole power to issue orders
requiring compliance with the Clean Water Act, to supersede state enforcement efforts if state
efforts prove insufficient, to establish effluent standards and regulations, to revise effluent
standards and limitations when necessary, and to grant variances when appropriate. Id.; see
supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing enforcement authority of Administrator of
EPA).
41. Clean Water Act, § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1982); see supra note 9 and accompanying
text (discussing enforcement authority of Administrator of EPA).
42. Hamker, 756 F.2d at 395; see infra note 81 and accompanying text (noting courts'
recognition of Administrator of EPA's authority to seek redress for past violations of effluent
standard, limitation, or order).
43. Hamker, 756 F.2d at 395. But see infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text (arguing
that plaintiffs in citizen suits have same authority as Administrator of EPA to seek redress for
past violations of effluent standard, limitation, or order).
44. Hamker, 756 F.2d at 395-96.
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of the EPA commences suit against a polluter within sixty days after a citizen

files a notice of intent to sue the polluter, section 505(b) precludes the citizen
from filing suit. 45 Similarly, the Hamker court reasoned that section 505(b)
should preclude a citizen from commencing a citizen suit if the alleged
violator establishes compliance before the citizen files suit, just as a citizen
loses the right to bring suit when the Administrator of the EPA commences
suit.46 The Fifth Circuit, therefore, found that section 505 grants citizens
supplemental enforcement authority only if the Government does not com-

mence action within sixty days and if the alleged violator is in violation 47
of
an effluent standard, limitation, or order at the time the citizen files suit.
In addition to construing the statutory language and structure of section
505 as a bar to citizen suits for past violations of an effluent standard,
limitation, or order, the Fifth Circuit in Hamker found that allowing citizen
suits for past violations would burden unduly the federal courts. 4 The Fifth
Circuit cited as support the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association. 49 In Middlesex, the Supreme Court considered whether section 505 of

the Clean Water Act created an implied federal claim for damages. 0 The

45. Id.; see Clean Water Act, § 505(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1982) (providing that
commencement of action by state or Administrator of EPA precludes citizen from maintaining
action against polluter); supranotes 18-21 and accompanying text (discussing notice requirements
of section 505 of Clean Water Act and effect on citizen plaintiffs of diligent prosecution by
government).
46. Hamker, 756 F.2d at 396.
47. Id.
48. Id. But see infra notes 126-28 and accompanying text (discussing flaw in Hamker
court's reasoning that precluding citizen suits based on past violations would limit burden on
federal courts).
49. 453 U.S. 1 (1981); Hamker, 756 F.2d at 396.
50. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 11. In
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, the plaintiffs filed suit in the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. Id. at 4. The plaintiffs in Middlesex
alleged that the defendants had discharged sewage and other pollutants into the New York
Harbor and the Hudson River. Id. at 4-5. The plaintiff's complaint further alleged that the
discharges had polluted the waters of the Atlantic Ocean and had caused the collapse of the
fishing and shellfish industries in the vicinity of the New York area. Id. at 5. The plaintiffs in
Middlesex sought injunctive and declaratory relief and $500 million in compensatory and
punitive damages. Id. The plaintiffs based the claims on the citizen suit provisions of the Clean
Water Act and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA), federal common
law, the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, the
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the Federal Tort
Claims Act, and various state environmental and tort laws. Id. at 5 n.6. The district court in
Middlesex found that the plaintiffs had not complied with the sixty day notice requirements of
both the Clean Water Act and MPRSA citizen suit provisions. Id. at 6; see Clean Water Act,
§ 505(b)(l)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) (1982) (providing that plaintiff in citizen suit under
Clean Water Act must give sixty days prior notice to Administrator of EPA, appropriate state
agency, and to alleged violator before filing suit); MPRSA, § 105(g)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. §
1415(g)(2)(A) (1982) (providing that plaintiff in citizen suit under MPRSA must give sixty days
notice to Administrator of EPA or the Secretary of the Army and to alleged violator before
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Supreme Court noted that section 505 contained a savings clause which
preserves other remedies that a citizen may have under any statute or the
common law." The Supreme Court, however, determined that the savings

clause of section 505 preserves remedies only under other statutes and not
under the Clean Water Act.5 2 In addition, the Supreme Court reasoned that
allowing an implied federal damage claim would conflict with Congress'
desire to prevent citizen suits from increasing the burden on the federal

courts.53 The Supreme Court, therefore, held that section 505 did not create

filing suit). The district court in Middlesex, therefore, refused to allow the plaintiffs to proceed
with citizen suits under the Clean Water Act and MPRSA without complying with the notice
provisions of the Clean Water Act and MPRSA. Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 7.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district
court's decision to dismiss the plaintiff's Clean Water Act and MPRSA claims because of the
plaintiff's failure to comply with the notice provisions of the Clean Water Act and MPRSA.
Id. at 8. The Third Circuit reasoned that section 505(a) of the Clean Water Act created a
limited cause of action for any person, injured or noninjured, to seek civil penalties for
violations of effluent standards or limitations. Id. at 15. In contrast, the Third Circuit determined
that section 505(e) of the Clean Water Act created an implied cause of action for injured
persons seeking relief for injuries caused by a polluter's violation of an effluent standard or
limitation. Id.; see Clean Water Act, § 505(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1982) (providing that citizen
suit provision of Clean Water Act does not preclude plaintiff's right to seek remedies under
common law or any statute). Accordingly, the Third Circuit found that the savings clause of
section 505(e) preserved the plaintiff's right of action for damages even though the plaintiff's
failure to give notice of intent to sue precluded the plaintiffs from bringing suit under section
505(a). Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 9. The Third Circuit applied the same reasoning to the plaintiff's
claims under MPRSA and found that MPRSA created an implied right of action to seek
injunctive relief and damages for violations of MPRSA. Id. at 15.
51. Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 15-16; see Clean Water Act, § 505(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e)
(1982) (providing that section 505 does not restrict person's right to seek any remedy under any
statute or common law.
52. Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 15-16. Before addressing the Third Circuit's finding that
section 505(e) of the Clean Water Act created an implied right of action for damages, the
Supreme Court in Middlesex examined the enforcement mechanisms of the Clean Water Act
and MPRSA. Id. at 13-14. The Supreme Court noted that both the Clean Water Act and
MPRSA authorize the Administrator of the EPA to bring suit against violators of the acts and
to seek civil and criminal penalties and injunctive relief. Id. In addition, the Supreme Court
noted that the citizen suit provisions of both the Clean Water Act and MPRSA provide specific
remedies for citizen plaintiffs. Id. The Supreme Court found that the enforcement mechanisms
of the Clean Water Act and MPRSA indicate that Congress intended to provide private citizens
with only the remedies expressly provided in the statutes. Id. at 14-15.
In addition to finding that the savings clause of section 505 preserved remedies only under
statutes other than the Clean Water Act, the Supreme Court in Middlesex rejected the Third
Circuit's reasoning that section 505(a) of the Clean Water Act created a limited cause of action
for noninjured plaintiffs. Id. at 16. The Supreme Court noted that section 505(g) of the Clean
Water Act defines a citizen as any person that may have an adversely affected interest. Id.; see
supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing section 505 definition of citizen).
53. Middlesex 453 U.S. at 18 n.27. The Supreme Court in Middlesex examined the
legislative history of the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act, which served as the model
for the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act. Id. The Middlesex court determined that
Congress excluded damage remedies from the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act to
limit the burden on the federal courts and to prevent frivolous and harassing suits against the
government and industries. Id.
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an implied federal damage claim.5 4 Applying the reasoning of the Supreme
Court in Middlesex, the Fifth Circuit in Hamker observed that citizen suits
based on past violations would permit plaintiffs to litigate all state damage
claims in federal court under pendent jurisdiction. 55 The Hamker court
determined that the availability of litigation costs under section 505 would
create a substantial incentive for plaintiffs to litigate state claims in a federal
forum.5 6 The Fifth Circuit, therefore, found that allowing citizen suits for
civil penalties for past violations of an effluent standard, limitation, or order
would undermine congressional intent in limiting the burden on the federal
courts."

Although the Fifth Circuit in Hamker held that a citizen could not
invoke federal subject matter jurisdiction to redress past violations of an
effluent standard, limitation, or order, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia in Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney
of Smithfield, Ltd.58 reached a different conclusion.5 9 In Gwaltney, the
defendant had exceeded sporadically the defendant's NPDES permit dis-

charge limitations for a period of approximately two and a half years .6 The
plaintiff in Gwaltney filed a citizen suit under section 505 of the Clean Water
Act and requested the court to assess a civil penalty of 10,000 dollars per
day of violation. 6' The Gwaltney court granted the plaintiff's motion for
partial summary judgment on the issue of whether the defendant had violated
the Clean Water Act. 62 The defendant, however, challenged the plaintiff's
standing to bring suit and the district court's subject matter jurisdiction
to
63
hear a citizen suit under section 505 of the Clean Water Act.

54. Id. at 18.
55. Hamker, 756 F.2d at 396.
56. Id.; see supra note 23 and accompanying text (noting availability of litigation costs
under section 505(d) of Clean Water Act).
57. Hamker, 756 F.2d at 396; see supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing
Congress' intent to limit burden on federal courts by excluding damage remedy from citizen
suit provision of Clean Air Act).
58. 611 F. Supp. 1542 (E.D. Va. 1985), aff'd, 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1544. The defendant in Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield,
Ltd. had exceed the defendant's NPDES permit for the discharge of fecal coliform, chlorine,
total suspended solids, total Kjeldahl nitrogen, and oil and grease. Id. at 1544 n.2; see supra
notes 7-8 and accompanying text (discussing NPDES permit system implemented under section
402 of Clean Water Act by Administrator of EPA and states).
61. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1544; see supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text
(discussing ability of citizens to file suit under section 505 of Clean Water Act and to seek civil
penalties for violation of effluent standard, limitation, or order).
62. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1544. Although the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia in Gwaltney granted the plaintiff's motion for partial summary
judgment concerning the defendant's alleged violations of the Clean Water Act, the Gwaltney
court's determination did not confer necessarily subject matter jurisdiction on the district court
to hear the case. Id. The district court in Gwaltney first had to establish that section 505 of the
Clean Water Act authorizes citizen suits based on allegations of past violations. Id.
63. Id. In addition to contesting the district court's subject matter jurisdiction and the
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The defendant in Gwaltney asserted that section 505 of the Clean Water
Act requires allegations of continuing violations to accord subject matter
jurisdiction to a federal court. 64 The defendant, therefore, contended that
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff's complaint
alleged only past violations. 65 In rejecting the defendant's contention, the
Gwaltney court first noted ambiguity in the language of section 505 which
authorizes citizen suits against polluters who are "in violation" of an effluent
standard, limitation, or order." The Gwaltney court made an analogy to a
taxpayer who underpays taxes for one year. 67 The Gwaltney court recognized
that the taxpayer remains in violation of the tax laws even though the
taxpayer complies with the tax laws in the following year. 68 The district court
in Gwaltney, therefore, reasoned that a polluter who violates a discharge
limitation may remain in violation even though the polluter later complies
69
with the discharge limitation.
After noting the ambiguity in the language of section 505, the Gwaltney
court examined the legislative history and the statutory language of sections
309 and 505 of the Clean Water Act. 70 The district court in Gwaltney
recognized that neither the statutory language nor the legislative history of
section 309 or section 505 limits expressly the assessment of civil penalties to
polluters that are engaged in only continuing violations of an effluent
standard, limitation, or order. 7 The Gwaltney court reasoned that the
absence of any time limitation on violations implies that Congress intended
to make polluters liable for both past and continuing violations of an effluent

plaintiff's standing to bring suit, the defendant in Gwaltney contested the defendant's maximum
liability and appropriate penalty for violation of the defendant's NPDES permit. Id. The district
court in Gwaltney devoted a major part of the opinion to determine the proper penalty to
assess the defendant. Id. at 1551-65. The Gwaltney court found that the defendant had exceeded
the defendant's NPDES permit discharge limitations for five different pollutants. Id. at 1544.
The Gwaltney court addressed the issue whether section 309 of the clean Water Act authorizes
a court to assess $10,000 per day for each violation or $10,000 per day for all violations
combined. Id.at 1522. The Gwaltney court imposed a limit of $10,000 per day of violation for
all pollutants combined. Id.; see supra note 25 (discussing Gwaltney court's application of
EPA's Civil Penalty Policy to assess civil penalty against Gwaltney defendant).
64. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp at 1547; see supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text
(discussing narrow interpretation of language of section 505 of Clean Water Act).
65. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1547.
66. Id.; see supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text (noting differing constructions of
language of section 505 of Clean Water Act); infra note 100 and accompanying text (noting
courts that found language of section 505 ambiguous).
67. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1547.
68. Id.
69. Id. In justifying that a polluter remains in violation of an effluent standard of
limitation even though the violation occurred in the past, the Gwaltney court recognized that
the effects of the defendant's illegal discharges may linger long after the discharges occur. Id.
The Gwaltney court, therefore, reasoned that subsequent compliance with an NPDES permit
does not mitigate a past violation. Id.
70. Id. at 1548.
71. Id.
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standard, limitation, or order!*2 The district court in Gwaltney, therefore,
found that the statutory language and legislative history of section 309 and
section 505 supports the conclusion that citizens may bring suits for past
violations of an effluent standard, limitation, or order. 7a
The Gwaltney court further determined that if citizens could not bring
suits based on past violations, the citizen suit provision would offer few
additional incentives for a polluter to comply with a discharge permit until
a citizen issues notice and files suit under section 505.74 The district court in
Gwaltney also recognized that plaintiffs in citizen suits would encounter
evidentiary problems if section 505 required a plaintiff to establish that the
defendant was violating a discharge limitation at the time the plaintiff filed
suit.75 The Gwaltney court reasoned that the evidentiary problems would
undermine further the deterrent effect of citizen suits. 76 The Gwaltney court,
therefore, concluded that the necessary deterrent effect of citizen suits

requires that citizens be able to allege past violations of an effluent standard,
77
limitation, or order.
The Gwaltney court correctly concluded that the legislative history and

statutory language of sections 309 and 505 of the Clean Water Act support
a broad construction of section 505 authorizing citizen suits based on either
past or continuing violations of the Clean Water Act. 78 United States Senator
Edmund Muskie, referring to the implications of section 505, stated that the
citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act enables citizens to file suit
against any polluter "who is alleged to be, or to have been, in violation" of
an effluent standard, limitation, or order. 79 In addition, section 505(a) of

72. Id.
73. Id.; see infra notes 78-85 and accompanying text (arguing that statutory construction
and legislative history of sections 309 and 505 of clean Water Act support authorization of
citizen suits based on past violations).
74. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1549; see supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text
(addressing notice requirements of section 505(b) of Clean Water Act).
75. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1549. In discussing the potential evidentiary problems that
plaintiffs would face in alleging continuing violations, the Gwaltney court noted that a
defendant's discharge reports are not available for public inspection until more than a month
after the discharge occurs. Id. The Gwaltney court also noted that requiring plaintiffs to allege
continuing violations would engage plaintiffs and defendants in discovery battles to ascertain
whether the defendant is in violation at the time the plaintiff initiates suit. Id.; see infra notes
91-96 and accompanying text (discussing evidentiary problems of plaintiffs in citizen suits when
plaintiff must allege continuing violations).
76. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1549.
77. Id.; see infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (arguing that narrow interpretation
of section 505 of Clean Water Act would undermine deterrent effect of citizen suits).
78. See Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1550 (finding that statutory language and legislative
history of Clean Water Act supports conclusion that section 505 of Clean Water Act authorizes
citizen suits based on past violations); infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text (examining
statutory construction of sections 309 and 505 Clean Water Act and legislative history of section
505).
79. See 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 179. Referring to the sixty day notice
provision of section 505 of the Clean Water Act, United States Senator Edmund Muskie stated
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the Clean Water Act authorizes the district courts in citizen suits to assess
any appropriate civil penalties that would be available in a government
enforcement proceeding under section 309(d).80 Section 309(d) of the Clean
Water Act permits the Administrator of the EPA to seek civil penalties
against any polluter who violates an effluent standard, limitation, or order,
and no court to date has questioned the ability of the Administrator of the
EPA to seek redress for past violations under section 309.81 Furthermore,
the legislative history shows that Congress cautioned the courts against
applying inconsistent policy in citizen suits and government enforcement
actions, because all enforcement proceedings would seek enforcement of the
same effluent standards and limitations . 82 Accordingly, some courts have
argued that Congress must have intended for the same enforcement standards
to be applicable to citizen-plaintiffs under section 505 as are applicable to
the Administrator of the EPA under section 309.83 Citizens, therefore, should
have the same authority to seek redress for past violations under section 505
as the Administrator of the EPA has authority to seek redress for past
violations under section 309. 84 Examination of the statutory structure of
sections 309 and 505, as well as the legislative history of section 505, thus,

that the drafters of the proposed bill did not intend for the notice requirement to preclude a
citizen's right of action to seek redress for violations that occurred 60 days earlier but were not
continuous. Id. Accordingly, Senator Muskie stated that section 505 authorizes citizcn suits
against polluters who are violating or have violated the Clean Water Act, regardless of whether
the violations are continuous, occasional, or sporadic. Id.
80. Clean Water Act, § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982); see supra notes 23-25 and
accompanying text (addressing availability of civil penalties in citizen suits).
81. Clean Water Act, § 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1982); see People of the State of Ill.
v. Outboard Marine Corp., 680 F.2d 473, 480-81 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that Administrator
of EPA may seek redress for past discharges in violation of NPDES permit); supra note 9 and
accompanying text (discussing enforcement ability of Administrator of EPA under section 309(d)
of Clean Water Act); cf. Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 756 F.2d 392, 395 (5th
Cir. 1985) (noting that Administrator of EPA may have authority to seek redress for past
violations of effluent standard, limitation, or order).
82. See S. REP. No. 414, supra note 2, at 80, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY, supra
note 2, at 1498. Senate Report 414 noted that the federal government under section 309 and
private citizens under section 505 would be seeking enforcement of the same effluent standards
or limitations. Id. Consequently, senate Report 414 reasoned that courts should apply consistent
policy in both government and citizen enforcement proceedings. Id.
83. See Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J. v. AT&T Bell Laboratories, 617
F. Supp. 1190, 1197-99 (D.N.J. 1985) (arguing that Congress intended uniform enforcement
standards for federal government and private enforcement proceedings); Student Pub. Interest
Research Group of N. J. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1419, 1425 (D.N.J. 1985)
(noting that remedies available to citizens and Administrator of EPA are same); Student Pub.
Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 1474, 1476 (D.N.J. 1985)
(noting that legislative history of Clean Water Act shows that citizens have same authority to
seek relief for past violations as federal government has authority to seek relief for past
violations); see also Miller, supra note 11, at 10319 (suggesting that Congress intended government agencies and citizens to have comparable causes of action and remedies under sections
309 and 505 of Clean Water Act).
84. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (arguing that both Administrator of
EPA and citizens may sue for past violations).

1550

WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1537

indicate that Congress intended past violations to be actionable under section

505 of the Clean Water Act."5
The Gwaltney court properly recognized that a narrow construction of

section 505 would undermine the deterrent effect of citizen suits.8 6 Congress
entrusted primary enforcement responsibility of Clean Water Act provisions

to the Administrator of the EPA and to the states.87 Some commentators,
however, have noted that the EPA has not enforced diligently the Clean

Water Act. 88 In addition, when discussing the enforcement responsibility of
the states, some courts have recognized that a state has a strong incentive

not to enforce permit limitations to induce industries to move to or to remain

in the state.8 9 Although the threat of government enforcement proceedings

85. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text (suggesting that analysis of legislative
history and statutory construction of sections 309 and 505 of Clean Water Act shows that
citizens may bring suit for past violations of effluent standard, limitation, or order); see also
Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 615 F. Supp.
1419, 1425 (D.N.J. 1985) (referring to legislative history and statutory language of section 505
of Clean Water Act to sustain citizen suit based on past violations); Sierra Club v.. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 585 F. Supp. 842, 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (noting that legislative history of section
505 of Clean Water Act suggests Congress intended for provide relief for past violations); Sierra
Club v. Raytheon Co., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1050, 1054 (D.Mass. 1984) (finding that
statutory language and legislative history of section 309 and 505 of Clean Water Act allow for
citizen suits based on past violations).
86. See Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1549 (finding that narrow interpretation of section 505
of Clean Water Act would undermine deterrent effect of citizen suits); supra notes 14-15 and
accompanying text (suggesting that narrow construction of section 505 of Clean Water Act
would preclude citizen suit against polluter who had violated effluent standard, limitation, or
order in past but who is currently in compliance with effluent standard, limitation, or order);
infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text (arguing that deterrent effect of citizen suits is
necessary to supplement deterrent effect of government enforcement actions). Numerous courts
have asserted that a narrow construction of section 505 would reduce the deterrent effect of
citizen suits. See, e.g., Student Pub. Interest Research group of N.J., Inc. v. AT&T Bell
Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1190, 1196 (D.N.J. 1985) (arguing that narrow construction of
language of section 505 of Clean Water Act would destroy effectiveness of citizen suits); Student
Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1419, 1426
(D.N.J. 1985) (noting that precluding citizen suits based on past violations severely would lessen
deterrent effect of citizen suit provision); Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J. v.
Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 1474, 1477 (D.N.J. 1985) (arguing that strict interpretation of
section 505 would not encourage deterrent effect of citizen suits); Sierra Club v. Aluminum Co.
of Am., 585 F. Supp 842, 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (concluding that allowing polluter to escape
liability for past violations would diminish substantially deterrent effect of citizen suits).
87. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing concurrent enforcement authority
of Administrator of EPA and states). See generally W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 534-50 (1977) (discussing enforcement under Clean Water Act and noting primary emphasis
on administrative remedies).
88. See Fadil, supra note 15, at 62-63 (1985) (noting lax enforcement of environmental
laws by federal government); Miller, supra note 16, at 10080 (noting lax enforcement by
governmental agencies benefits polluters).
89. See American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (finding
that Congress intended to impose uniform limitations on polluters to prevent competition
between states for industry); Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J. v. AT&T Bell
Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1190, 1197 (D.N.J. 1985) (arguing that states have strong incentive
not to combat pollution because of competition between states for industries).
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would provide some incentive for polluters to comply with discharge limitations, the deterrent effect of unconstrained citizen enforcement is necessary
to supplement the deterrent effect of government enforcement. 9°
In addition to assessing correctly the effect of a narrow construction of

section 505 on the deterrent effect of citizen suits, the Gwaltney court
recognized properly that a narrow construction of section 505 would produce

evidentiary difficulties for citizen-plaintiffs. 9' Section 308 of the Clean Water
Act requires polluters who have obtained NPDES permits to sample effluent
discharges and to submit periodic discharge monitoring reports (DMRs) of
effluent discharges to the Administrator of the EPA. 92 In accordance with
section 308, the Administrator of the EPA and the public may use the DMRs
to determine whether a polluter has violated the conditions of the NPDES
permit. 93 The DMRs, however, are not available until well after the discharge
violation occurs. 94 Evidence of a continuing violation, therefore, would be
virtually unattainable. 95 If courts interpret section 505 as precluding citizens
suits based on past violations, polluters who violate NPDES permits would

be immune from citizen enforcement. 96

90. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text (arguing that lax government enforcement increases need for citizen suits).
91. See Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1549 (recognizing that plaintiffs would face evidentiary
problems if section 505 of Clean Water Act precludes citizen suits based on past violations);
infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text (arguing that evidence of continuing violation is
difficult to obtain); see also Friends of the Earth v. Facet Enter., 618 F. Supp. 532, 535 n.1
(W.D.N.Y. 1984) (noting that plaintiffs would face difficulties in verifying violations at time
plaintiff files suit).
92. Clean Water Act, § 308(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a) (1982); see supra notes 7-8 and
accompanying text (discussing NPDES permit system); 40 C.F.R. § 122.41 (1985) (providing
federal regulations for discharge monitoring reports (DMRs) under NPDES permit system of
Clean Water Act).
93. Clean Water Act, § 308(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(2) (1982); see infra note 142 and
accompanying text (noting courts that granted summary judgment on issue of liability for
violations contained in defendant's DMRs).
94. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.41 (1985); Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J. v.
AT&T Bell Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1190, 1194 (D.N.J. 1985) (noting that DMRs would not
be availaBle for public inspection until months after violation occurs); Chesapeake Bay Found.
v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542, 1549 (E.D. Va. 1985) (noting that DMRs
are not available to public until month after discharge occurs). Polluters must submit DMRs to
the EPA at intervals specified in the polluter's NPDES permit. 40 C.F.R. § 122.41 (1985). In
addition, if a polluter violates a maximum daily discharge limitation listed in the polluter's
NPDES permit, the polluter must notify orally the EPA or the appropriate state agency within
24 hours after the polluter receives the discharge sampling analysis. Id. Further, the polluter
must submit a written noncompliance report (NCR) within five days after the polluter becomes
aware of the violation. Id. Within a reasonable time, the EPA or appropriate state agency must
make the DMRs and NCRs available for public inspection. Id.
95. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (noting that allegation of continuing
violations requires polluter to be in violation at time plaintiff files suit); supra note 94 and
accompanying text (recognizing that evidence of continuing violation is difficult to obtain).
96. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text (arguing that proof of continuing
violations would be difficult to obtain under narrow construction of section 505 of Clean Water
Act).
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Notwithstanding the Gwaltney court's conclusion that section 505 of the
Clean Water Act authorizes citizen suits based on past violations, the
defendant in Gwaltney relied upon the Fifth Circuit's analysis in Hamker to
support the defendant's contention that the Gwaltney court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction. 97 The district court in Gwaltney, however, disagreed with
the Hamker court's reasoning. 9 The Gwaltney court first questioned the

Hamker court's inability to perceive ambiguity in the language of section
505. 99 The Gwaltney court noted that several other courts had been unable
to resolve the meaning of section 505's language from the face of the
statute.100 The Gwaltney court also found attenuated the Hamker court's

reasoning that Congress' action in giving the Administrator of the EPA and
the states primary enforcement responsibility precluded the power of citizens
to seek redress for past violations under section 505.10" The Gwaltney court
reasoned that allowing citizen suits based on past violations would not alter
materially the primary enforcement responsibility of the Administrator of

the EPA and the states. 02 The Gwaltney court also questioned the Hamker

court's reasoning that the notice requirement of section 505 precludes a
citizen from filing suit if the polluter establishes compliance within the sixty
day waiting period. 03 The district court in Gwaltney recognized that section

97. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1550; see Hamker, 756 F.2d at 399. In Hamker, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint because the complaint failed to allege
a continuing violation of an effluent standard, limitation, or order. 756 F.2d at 399; see supra
notes 35-57 and accompanying text (discussing Fifth Circuit's analysis in Hamker).
98. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1550-51; see infra notes 99-109 and accompanying text
(discussing Gwaltney court's anaLysis of Hamker court's reasoning).
99. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1550; see Hamker, 756 F.2d at 395 (Hamker court asserting
that clear statutory language of section 505 of Clean Water Act requires plaintiffs in citizen
suits to allege ongoing violation).
100. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1550. Several courts have found the language of section
505 of the Clean Water Act to be ambiguous. See, e.g., Fishel v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
617 F. Supp. 1531, 1541 (M.D. Pa. 1985) (noting that one plausible construction of section
505's language is to allow citizen suits based on past violations); Student Pub. Interest Research
Group of N.J. v. Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 1474, 1476 (D.N.J. 1985) (suggesting that
language of section 505 does not limit necessarily violations to current or continuing violations);
Sierra Club v. Raytheon Co., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1050, 1054 (D. Mass. 1984) (noting
ambiguity of section 505).
101. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1550; see supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text
(discussing Hamker court's finding that primary enforcement responsibility of Administrator of
EPA precludes authority of citizens to seek redress for past violations under section 505 of
Clean Water Act).
102. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1550; see supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text (discussing
enforcement authority of states and Administrator of EPA under Clean Water Act); supra
notes 18-20 and accompanying text (noting that, under either broad or narrow construction of
section 505, diligent prosecution of or commencement of action against polluter precludes
citizen from filing suit).
103. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1550; see supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text
(discussing Hamker court's reasoning that notice of intent to sue requirements of section 505
of Clean Water Act precludes citizen from filing suit if polluter establishes compliance within
60 day waiting period).
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505 expressly precludes a citizen from filing suit if the Administrator of the
EPA or a state agency commences action against a polluter within sixty days
after the citizen files a notice of intent to sue.'04 The Gwaltney court,
however, also recognized that nothing in the language of section 505 precludes
expressly a citizen from filing suit against a polluter if the polluter establishes
compliance with the discharge limitation within the sixty day period. 05 The
Gwaltney court, therefore, found inappropriate the inference that both
government enforcement action and compliance by a polluter suffice to
6
preclude a citizen from initiating suit under section 505.'0
The district court in Gwaltney also rejected the Hamker court's determination that precluding citizen suits based on past violations would limit
the burden on the federal courts.'0 The Gwaltney court reasoned that the
number of violations actionable under section 505 could increase dramatically
if courts restricted citizen suits to allegations of continuing violations because
limiting actions to continuing violations would reduce the deterrent effect on
polluters.10 The Gwaltney court, therefore, postulated that the number of
citizen suits filed actually could increase if section 505 precluded citizen suits
based on past violations.'°9
Although the number of citizen suits filed could increase if courts
interpreted section 505 as authorizing citizen suits based on only continuing
violations, the possibility remains, as noted by the Hamker court, that
precluding citizen suits based on past violations could limit the burden on
the federal courts."10 The Hamker court, however, incorrectly relied upon
the Supreme Court's decision in Middlesex to support the proposition that
section 505 precludes citizen suits that allege only past violations."' In
Middlesex, the Supreme Court was concerned with the issue whether section
505 created an implied federal damage claim." 2 In addition, the legislative

104. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1550; see supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text
(discussing notice of intent to sue requirements of section 505(b) of Clean Water Act).
105. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1550; see Clean Water Act, § 505(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)
(1982). Section 505(b) of the Clean Water Act precludes a citizen from filing suit if the
Administrator of the EPA or a state commences action against a polluter within 60 day period
but does not address whether compliance by polluter within 60 day period precludes citizen
from filing suit. Clean Water Act, § 505(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1982).
106. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1550.
107. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1551; see supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text
(addressing Hamker court's argument that citizen suits based on past violations would increase
burden on federal courts).
108. Gwaltney. 611 F. Supp. at 1551; see supra note 74 and accompanying text (noting
Gwaltney court's argument that precluding citizen suits based on past violations would reduce
deterrent effect of citizen suits).
109. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1551.
110. See Hamker, 756 F.2d at 396 (arguing that citizen suits based on past violations would
undermine congressional intent to limit burden on federal courts).
111. See infra notes 112-20 and accompanying text (noting that Supreme Court in Middlesex
considered effect of implied federal damage claim on federal court burden rather than effect of
citizen suits based on past violations).
112. See Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 13-18 (holding that section 505 of Clean Water Act did
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history cited by the Supreme Court in Middlesex expressed Congress' concern

that allowing the recovery of damages in citizen suits would promote frivolous
and harassing suits against polluters and would burden unduly the federal

courts." 3' Neither the Supreme Court in Middlesex nor Congress, however,
has expressed a concern that citizen suits based on past violations would
burden unduly the federal courts." 4 The Hamker court failed to consider

that an implied right to sue for damages is quite different from a right to
bring a citizen suit for past violations of an effluent standard, limitation, or
order." 5 An implied right to sue for damages, for instance, could result in a

financial award to successful plaintiffs and could increase the burden on the
federal courts."16 In contrast, a citizen suit based on past violations would

not increase the possibility of financial gain for plaintiffs because the
remedies available to plaintiffs remain the same regardless of whether section
505 authorizes citizen suits based on past violations or only on continuing
violations."17 Accordingly, citizen suits based on past violations only would

serve to insure the health and welfare of the plaintiff and similarly situated

not create implied damage claim); supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme
Court's decision in Middlesex).
113. See Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 17 n.l. In Middlesex, the Supreme Court cited the legislative
history of the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act, which served as a model for the
citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act. Id. The legislative history of the Clean Air Act
shows Congress' concern that allowing a damage remedy in citizen suits would burden unduly
the federal courts and would promote frivolous and harassing suits against polluters. 116 CONG.
REc. 33102-04 (1970). Furthermore, the legislative history provides that Congress expressly
excluded a damage remedy from citizen suits to limit a plaintiff's financial incentive to bring
suit. Id. By limiting a plaintiff's financial incentive to bring a citizen suit, Congress intended
that plaintiffs would bring citizen suits only to preserve the health and welfare of those persons
adversely affected by the defendant's violations. Id.; see supra note 53 and accompanying text
(discussing Supreme Court's reasoning in Middlesex that allowing implied damage claim under
section 505 of Clean Water Act would conflict with Congress' intent to limit burden on federal
courts).
114. See supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text (noting that Supreme Court and
Congress expressed concern that allowing damage remedy in citizen suits under Clean Air Act
would increase burden on federal courts).
115. See Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 615 F.
Supp. 1419, 1426 n.3 (D.N.J. 1985) (noting that Hamker court failed to address difference
between right to bring citizen suit for past violations and implied right to sue for damages);
infra notes 116-19 and accompanying text (noting difference between implied right to sue for
damages under section 505 of Clean Water Act and right to initiate citizen suit for past violations
of Clean Water Act).
116. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text (noting United States Supreme Court's
concern that allowing implied federal damage claim in citizen suits under section 505 would
conflict with Congress' intent to limit burden on federal courts); supra note 113 (noting
Congress' concern that allowing damage remedy in citizen suits would provide financial incentive
for plaintiff to bring citizen suit and would increase burden on federal courts).
117. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text (recognizing ability of plaintiffs in
citizen suits under section 505 of Clean Water Act to seek injunctive relief, civil penalties, and
litigation costs); infra note 127 and accompanying text (arguing that plaintiffs in citizen suits
filed pursuant to section 505 of Clean Water Act may append state damage claim to any claim
arising under section 505).
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persons by making polluters liable for any violation of an effluent standard,
limitation, or order."" Although citizen suits based on past violations may
increase the burden on the federal courts, the increased burden is necessary
if citizen suits are to serve as a useful supplement to government enforcement." '9 Nevertheless, the Hamker court sought to limit the burden on the
20
federal courts by precluding citizen suits based on past violations.
The Hamker court expressed a valid concern that appended state damage
claims may increase the burden of the federal courts.' 2' The Hamker court
noted that plaintiffs who may assert state damage claims have an incentive
to litigate the claim in a federal forum. 22 One commentator has noted that,
because defendants in citizen suits under section 505 face the threat of civil
penalties, plaintiffs in citizen suits could use the threat of civil penalties as
leverage in pretrial negotiations to force a more favorable settlement of the
state damage claim.' 23 In addition, the possibility of court awarded litigation
costs under section 505 may increase a plaintiff's incentive to litigate the
state claim in federal court. 24 The increased incentive to litigate a state
damage claim in federal court, therefore, could result in an increased burden
on the federal courts.' 25 The Hamker court, however, incorrectly attempted
to limit the burden on the federal courts and to restrict state damage claims
to state court by precluding citizen suits based on past violations. 26 The

118. See supra note 113 (noting Congress' desire that plaintiffs bring citizen suits only to
protect health and welfare of those individuals injured by polluter's violations).
119. See supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text (arguing that citizen suits based on past
violations are necessary supplement to federal government enforcement actions); Fadil, supra
note 15, at 53 (asserting Congress expected citizen suits to increase burden on federal courts
but accepted increased burden as justifiable).
120. Hamker, 756 F.2d at 396.
121. See id. (finding that pendent state damage claims would increase burden on federal
courts); infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text (arguing that possible use of civil penalties
as leverage and availability of litigation costs under section 505 of Clean Water Act would
increase plaintiff's incentive litigate state claim in federaL court and would increase burden on
federal courts).
122. Hamker, 756 F.2d at 396; see supra note 121 and accompanying text (arguing that
Hamker court correctly assessed effect of state daMage claims on federal court burden); infra
note 124 and accompanying text (noting Hamker court's finding that availability of litigation
costs in citizen suits may increase incentive of plaintiffs to file suit in federal court).
123. See Miller, supra note 11, at 10319 n.100 (noting that plaintiffs with appended state
damage claims could use threat of civil penalties under section 309 as bargaining tool to induce
more favorable settlement of state claim); supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text (discussing
availability of civil penalties under section 505 of Clean Water Act and noting possible assessment
of large civil penalty against defendant).
124. See Hamker, 756 F.2d at 396 (arguing that award of reasonable attorney's fees and
expert witness fees would increase plaintiff's incentive to bring suit in federal court); supra note
23 and accompanying text (discussing availability of litigation costs under section 505 of Clean
Water Act).
125. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text (arguing that use of civil penalties as
leverage and possibility of court awarded litigation costs increase incentive to bring suit in
federal court).
126. See Hamker, 756 F.2d at 396 (interpreting section 505 of Clean Water Act as precluding
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Hamker court failed to consider that a citizen-plaintiff could append a state
damage claim to any claim arising under section 505, even if section 505
required allegations of continuing violations to invoke federal subject matter
jurisdiction. 2 7 Appended state damage claims, therefore, could increase the
burden on the federal courts even if courts interpreted
section 505 as
28

precluding citizen suits based on past violations.
Rather than precluding citizen suits based on past violations, an alternative method of limiting the burden on the federal courts, recently suggested
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on appeal
from the district court's decision in Gwaltney, is for federal courts to exercise
discretion in granting jurisdiction over state damage claims.' 29 Under the
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction expressed by the United States Supreme
Court in United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs,'30 a plaintiff may
append a state claim to a federal claim if both claims derive from a common

citizen suits based on past violations to prevent plaintiffs from litigating state damage claims in
federal court under pendent jurisdiction); Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J. v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1419, 1426 (D.N.J. 1985) (distinguishing Hamker on issue
of state damage claim); supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text (arguing that section 505 of
Clean Water Act authorizes citizen suits based on past violations); infra note 129 and accompanying text (suggesting that courts should use discretion in exercising pendent jurisdiction over
state damage claims rather than precluding citizen suits based on past violations).
127. See infra note 131 and accompanying text (doctrine of pendent jurisdiction requires
only that federal and appended state claims derive from common nucleus of operative fact and
that plaintiff ordinarily would try both claims in one action).
128. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (noting that appended state damage claims
may increase burden on federal courts); supra text accompanying note 127 (asserting that
plaintiffs may append state damage claims to citizen suits based on continuing violations).
129. See Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304, 313
(4th Cir. 1986) (noting that cautious exercise of pendent jurisdiction by federal courts in citizen
suits would help to limit burden on federal courts); infra notes 133-143 and accompanying text
(suggesting that courts should weigh considerations of judicial economy, convenience, fairness
to litigants, and substantial predominance of state issues in exercising discretion to grant pendent
jurisdiction over state damage claims).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Chesapeake Bay Found.,
Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. recognized the concern, expressed by the Fifth Circuit in
Hamker, that citizen suits could inundate the federal courts and, thus, undermine Congress'
desire to limit the burden on the federal courts. Gwaltney, 791 F.2d at 313; see Hamker, 756
F.2d at 356 (arguing that citizen suits based on past violations of section 505 of Clean Water
Act would increase burden on federal courts). While recognizing the concern, however, the
Fourth Circuit declined to restrict unduly the scope of citizen suits. Gwaltney, 791 F.2d at 313.
The Fourth Circuit distinguished the Hamker decision because the plaintiff in Hamker, according
to the Fourth Circuit, used the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act merely as a
medium to litigate the plaintiff's state damage claim in federal court. Id. The Fourth Circuit
suggested that district courts in cases similar to Hamker should decline to exercise pendent
jurisdiction over state claims. Id. According to the Fourth Circuit, declining to exercise pendent
jurisdiction over state damage claims would counter the incentive for plaintiffs to litigate state
damage claims in federal court. Id.; see supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (noting that
Hamker court's analysis that availability of litigation costs under section 505 of Clean Water
Act creates incentive for plaintiffs with state damage claims to bring suit in federal court).
130. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
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nucleus of operative fact and the plaintiff ordinarily would try both claims
in one judicial proceeding. 3 ' According to the Supreme Court in Gibbs,
however, the exercise of pendent jurisdiction is within the sound discretion
of a federal court.'3 2 Judicial economy, convenience, fairness to litigants,
and substantial predominance of state issues are considerations that weigh
in the exercise of a court's discretion.' 33 One consideration that supports the
exercise of pendent jurisdiction over state damage claims asserted in citizen
suits under section 505 is that dismissal of the state claims would not promote
judicial economy.'3 4 Section 505 of the Clean Water Act grants the federal
district courts exclusive jurisdiction to hear citizen suits.' 3 5 If a federal court
declines to exercise jurisdiction over a citizen-plaintiff's state damage claim,
the citizen-plaintiff must maintain two actions, one in federal court and the
other in state court.' 3 6 Dismissal of a state damage claim, therefore, could
37
result in trial duplication.

131. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725; see Sun Enter., Ltd v. Train,
394 F. Supp. 211, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (declining to exercise pendent jurisdiction over state
damage claims in citizen suit under Clean Water Act because state claims present substantial
issues of additional fact and state and federal claims do not derive from common nucleus of
operative fact).
132. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726; see Sun Enter., Ltd. v. Train, 394 F. Supp. 211, 224
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). In Sun Enter., Ltd v. Train, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York dismissed the plaintiff's pendent state claim because the state and federal
claims did not derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. Sun Enter., Ltd. v. Train, 394
F. Supp. at 224. In dicta, the Sun Enter. court also concluded that the court would decline to
exercise pendent jurisdiction even if the court had the power to exercise jurisdiction. Id. The
Sun Enter. court, however, gave no reason why the court would not exercise discretion to grant
jurisdiction over the plaintiff's pendent state claim. Id.
133. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
134. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976) (finding that grant of exclusive
jurisdiction to federal courts, in addition to considerations of judicial economy and convenience,
strengthens argument for exercise of pendent jurisdiction because plaintiff may try all claims
together only in federal court); infra notes 135-37 and accompanying text (recognizing that
dismissal of appended state damage claim would force plaintiff to maintain two civil actions
against polluter because federal courts have jurisdiction exclusive of state courts to hear citizen
suits under section 505 of Clean Water Act). But see Miller, Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction,
26 S. TEx. L.J. 1, 3 (1985) (arguing that concept of limited federal court jurisdiction contained
in Article III of United States Constitution undermines consideration of judicial economy as
support for exercise of pendent jurisdiction).
135. See Clean Water Act, § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982) (providing that federal
district courts shall have jurisdiction to hear citizen suits); 28 U.S.C. § 1355 (1982) (providing
that federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over actions for recovery or enforcement
of fines, penalties, or forfeitures incurred under any congressional act).
136. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (noting that exercise of pendent jurisdiction
is within discretion of federal courts); supra note 135 and accompanying text (recognizing that
state courts do not have jurisdiction to hear citizen suits under section 505 of Clean Water
Act); Miller, supra note 134, at 4 (noting that court's refusal to exercise pendent jurisdiction
would result in separate litigation of federal and state claims).
137. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (recognizing that dismissal of state damage
claim in court's discretion could result in two trials); Miller, supra note 134, at 4 (noting that
separate litigation of federal and state claims could result in trial duplication or inconsistent
results).
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Although considerations of judicial economy may support an exercise of
pendent jurisdiction over state damage claims, fairness to the litigants in a
citizen suit may dictate dismissal of the pendent state damage claim in some
situations.3 8 For example, the threat of civil penalties in citizen suits filed
pursuant to section 505 could induce unfairly the defendant to settle the suit
when the defendant may have a valid defense to the state damage claim. a9

In addition to fairness to the litigants, predominance of state issues in citizen
suits may support a court's decision to dismiss a pendent state damage

claim.

4

If the basis of citizen suit is violations of an NPDES permit, the

defendant's own DMRs contain proof of the violations.' 4' As a result,
plaintiffs who allege violations of NPDES permits based on the defendant's

DMRs may move for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability.

42

Proof of liability under state law, however, may involve more complex

questions of causation and actual damages. Predominance of state issues
in
43
citizen suits, therefore, may justify dismissing the state damage claim.
Citizen participation in the enforcement of effluent standards and limitations is a necessary supplement to government enforcement of the Clean
Water Act.' 44 The vague language of section 505 of the Clean Water Act,

however, makes unclear whether Congress intended for alleged violators in
citizen suits to be liable for past violations of an effluent standard, limitation,

138. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (fairness to litigants is one consideration
in exercise of court's discretion to hear state claim under pendent jurisdiction); infra text
accompanying note 139 (recognizing possibility that plaintiff's use of civil penalties as leverage
in settlement of state damage claim may be unfair to defendant).
139. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (asserting that plaintiffs in citizen suits
could force favorable settlement of state damage claim by using threat of civil penalties as
leverage).
140. See Miller, supra note 134 and accompanying text (suggesting that courts dismiss
pendent state claims if court grants summary judgment of federal claim or if parties settle
federal claim before trial); supra note 133 and accompanying text (noting that predominance of
state issues is consideration in exercise of court's discretion in granting jurisdiction over state
claim); infra note 141-43 and accompanying text (arguing that state issues in citizen suit based
on NPDES permit violations may predominate over federal issues).
141. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (noting that government and private citizens
may use DMRs as evidence of polluter's violation of NPDES permit).
142. See, e.g., Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J. v. AT&T Bell Laboratories,
617 F. Supp. 1190, 1203-06 (D.N.J. 1985) (granting plaintiff's motion for partial summary
judgment on issue of liability on basis of DMRs); Student Pub. Interest Research Group of
N.J. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1419, 1429-32 (D.N.J. 1985) (same); Gwaltney,
611 F. Supp. at 1544 (same).
143. See Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304, 313
(4th Cir. 1986) (noting that state damage claim in Hamker predominated over Clean Water Act
claim); supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text (arguing that predominance of states issues
of liability over federal issues of liability may justify dismissing state claim).
144. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (noting that Clean Water Act provides for
public participation in enforcement of effluent standards, limitations, and orders, in addition
to enforcement powers of Administrator of EPA and states); supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (arguing that citizen suits are necessary supplement to deterrent effect of government
enforcement).
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or order.' 45 The legislative history and statutory structure of the Clean Water
Act, on the other hand, provide both direct and implicit support for a broad
interpretation of section 505 authorizing citizen suits based on past violations. 46 In addition, citizen suits based on past violations are necessary if
47
citizen enforcement is to have a sufficient deterrent effect on polluters.'

Plaintiffs in citizen suits who assert state damage claims under pendent
jurisdiction, however, may frustrate Congress' desire to limit the burden on
the federal courts. 48 To prevent frivolous and harassing citizen suits against
polluters and to limit the burden on the federal courts, courts should exercise
discretion in granting pendent jurisdiction over state damage claims. 49 Courts
should not attempt, however, to limit state damage claims by precluding

citizen suits based on past violations.'50

THOMAS J. WOODFORD

145. See Clean Water Act, § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982) (authorizing citizen suits
against polluters "alleged to be in violation" of effluent standard, limitation, or order); supra
notes 14-15 and accompanying text (noting that narrow construction of language of section 505
precludes citizen suits based on past violations); supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text
(noting that broad construction of language of section 505 authorizes citizen suits based on
either past or continuing violations); supra note 100 and accompanying text (noting courts that
found language of section 505 ambiguous).
146. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (discussing Gwaltney court's finding
that legislative history and statutory language of sections 309 and 505 of Clean Water Act
support broad construction of section 505 authorizing citizen suits based on past violations);
supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text (arguing that legislative history of section 505 and
statutory construction of section 309 and 505 of Clean Water Act support authorization of
citizen suits based on either past or continuing violations).
147. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (addressing Gwaltney court's conclusion
that precluding citizen suits on past violations would undermine deterrent effect of citizen suits);
supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (suggesting that deterrent effect of citizen suits is
necessary to supplement deterrent effect of government enforcement).
148. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text (expressing Supreme Court's concern in
Middlesex and Hamker court's concern that damage claims may conflict with Congress' intent
to limit burden on federal courts); supra note 113 and accompanying text (noting Congress'
concern that inclusion of federal damage remedy in citizen suit provision would increase federal
court burden and would encourage frivolous and harassing suits against polluters); supra notes
121-28 and accompanying text (arguing that state damage claims may increase federal court
burden).
149. See supra notes 129-43 and accompanying text (suggesting that courts should use
discretion in exercising pendent jurisdiction over state damage claims).
150. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text (proposing that Hamker court incorrectly precluded citizen suits based on past violations in attempt to restrict state damage claims
to state courts and to limit burden on federal courts); Fadil, supra note 15, at 77 (arguing that
Congress' intent to limit burden on federal courts should not induce courts to dismiss citizen
suits that have Congress' express grant of federal jurisdiction).

